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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the popular “information transmitted”
interpretation of absolute judgments, and to provide an alternative interpretation if one is needed.
Design/methodology/approach – The psychologists Garner and Hake and their successors used
Shannon’s Information Theory to quantify information transmitted in absolute judgments of sensory
stimuli. Here, information theory is briefly reviewed, followed by a description of the absolute judgment
experiment, and its information theory analysis. Empirical channel capacities are scrutinized.
A remarkable coincidence, the similarity of maximum information transmitted to human memory
capacity, is described. Over 60 representative psychology papers on “information transmitted” are
inspected for evidence of memory involvement in absolute judgment. Finally, memory is conceptually
integrated into absolute judgment through a novel qualitative model that correctly predicts how
judgments change with increase in the number of judged stimuli.
Findings – Garner and Hake gave conflicting accounts of how absolute judgments represent
information transmission. Further, “channel capacity” is an illusion caused by sampling bias and
wishful thinking; information transmitted actually peaks and then declines, the peak coinciding with
memory capacity. Absolute judgments themselves have numerous idiosyncracies that are incompatible
with a Shannon general communication system but which clearly imply memory dependence.
Research limitations/implications – Memory capacity limits the correctness of absolute
judgments. Memory capacity is already well measured by other means, making redundant the
informational analysis of absolute judgments.
Originality/value – This paper presents a long-overdue comprehensive critical review of the
established interpretation of absolute judgments in terms of “information transmitted”. An inevitable
conclusion is reached: that published measurements of information transmitted actually measure memory
capacity. A new, qualitative model is offered for the role of memory in absolute judgments. The model is
well supported by recently revealed empirical properties of absolute judgments.
Keywords Information theory, Cybernetics, Memory
Paper type Research paper
Introduction – psychology and first-order cybernetics
The year 1948 was auspicious. It heralded two cornerstones of first-order cybernetics,
Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Wiener,
1948, reprinted in 1961), the book that founded the cybernetics movement, and A
Mathematical Theory of Communication (Shannon, 1948; reprinted in 1974), in
which Shannon presented the formulation of information theory that is still used
today. Shannon’s Information Theory gained immediate acceptance and precipitated
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a new journal, IEE Transactions in Information Theory, to handle the mass of ensuing
research. Shannon’s theory also enabled the writing of a particularly influential paper
that dealt with social science rather than engineering. That paper, which appeared in
Psychological Review, was entitled “The amount of information in absolute judgments”
(Garner and Hake, 1951). Its authors introduced an information theory analysis of “how
accurately the O (observer) perceived which of several alternative stimuli occurred on a
particular presentation, or how much information the O obtained about which stimulus
occurred” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 459), that is, “the amount of information which
the stimuli transmit to an O” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 459). The Garner and Hake
approach was just as quickly accepted in experimental psychology as Shannon’s
mathematics had been in engineering. Subsequent to Garner and Hake there were
hundreds of published estimates of the information transmitted in absolute judgments.
The Garner-Hake approach has greatly affected the study of human perception, and
continues to do so today. As the British Historian Alan Collins noted, information “was
to be a central term in the development of accounts of cognition” (Collins, 2007, p. 54),
and Garner and Hake (1951) were at the forefront of that effort. Papers that use the
Garner-Hake approach continue to be published; Garner and Hake (1951) has been cited
at least 171 times to date, according to the online Institute for Scientific Information
database, and the Garner-Hake measure is taught to psychology students from
contemporary textbooks. However, the constituency of those who use the Garner-Hake
approach is much broader than might at first appear. The Garner-Hake computations
were most highly popularized not by Garner and Hake themselves, but by the first
published review of the Garner-Hake method and its results, that of Miller (1956b).
Miller’s erudite review has been cited at least 4,589 times to date in sources on
psychology, general cybernetics, systems theory, information engineering, human
factors, management, neurology, and music. The Garner-Hake approach was
popularized further by Attneave (1959) in a review monograph, since cited at least
809 times. Attneave’s book included a thorough summary of the empirical results of
the time, as well as a detailed account of all of the necessary mathematical operations.
The information measure that was introduced by Garner and Hake (1951) and
popularized by Miller (1956b) and Attneave (1959) was part of the movement to provide:
[. . .] an explanatory framework that would dissolve the human-machine boundary and lead to
psychological explanations expressed as formal mathematical models that would be, in
essence, communication and controls systems dealing with information (Collins, 2007, p. 52).
However, the use of the Garner-Hake method has been paralleled by persistent doubts
(starting with Cronbach, 1955) about whether it tells much, if anything, about the
physiological processing of information. The present paper supplies justifications for
those doubts, simply by examining the Garner-Hake approach. The paper does not rely
upon opinions expressed in available review papers, because those reviews have all
accepted, without question, the Garner and Hake declaration that their method
quantifies transmitted information. Rather, the present paper returns to the basics. The
first topic is Shannon’s (1974) algebra, which Garner and Hake adopted to process their
data. We then review the Garner and Hake method itself. The latter proves
inappropriate. Further, there is a reasonable alternative interpretation that has existed
all along. That interpretation will be expanded into a new model of what Garner and
Hake actually measured.
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A very brief review of Shannon’s Information Theory
Shannon (1974) quantified the amount of information passing through what he called a
“general communication system”, a system that Shannon illustrated with a simple
box-and-stick model. Figure 1 shows a somewhat more detailed version of the system,
made from Shannon’s accompanying description. In Shannon’s own words, the system
comprises:
. “An information source which produces a message or sequence of messages to be
communicated to the receiving terminal”.
. “A transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce a signal
suitable for transmission over the channel”.
. “The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter
to receiver”.
. “The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by the
transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal” finally.
. “The destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended”
(all quotations from Shannon, 1974, p. 5).
n “events” are possible, and their respective probabilities of occurrence are known and
are denoted pi, i ¼ 1, . . . , n. When an event happens, it becomes an “outcome”.
The outcome is uncertain when n . 1. Figure 2 shows event and outcome. An outcome
is accompanied by reduction of uncertainty, which is a gain in information. Shannon
argued that:
. uncertainty is a function of the pi, and a continuous one;
. when pi ¼ 1/n (i.e. all events are equiprobable), an increase in n causes an
increase in uncertainty; and
. uncertainty is the same regardless of the number of successive steps leading to
the outcome.
Figure 1.
Shannon’s general
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Shannon proved that the amount of “uncertainty”, “choice”, or “information” that is
inherent to the set of n events is:
The stimulus information IS;
where IS ¼ 2K
Xn
i¼1
pi log pi; K is constant; K . 0:
ð1Þ
K “amounts to the choice of a unit of measure” (Shannon, 1974, p. 17), so Shannon set
K ¼ 1. When all events are equiprobable, IS is at its maximum, log n. Events can be
symbols “k”, for which:
IS ¼ 2
k
X
pðkÞlog pðkÞ: ð2Þ
The “confusion matrix”
Information transmitted
Transmission errors occur, so that some symbols are not received as transmitted.
The algebra was potentially quite complicated; Shannon (1974) simplified it by assuming
that any symbol received is one of the symbols available to send. Denoting p j (k) as the
probability of transmission of symbol k given reception of symbol j, Shannon derived:
ES ¼ 2
j
X
k
X
pjðkÞlog pjðkÞ; the stimulus equivocation=uncertainty=entropy; ð3Þ
Figure 2.
Events and outcomes
according
to Shannon (1974)
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hence:
Information transmitted I t ¼ IS 2 ES
¼ 2
k
X
pðkÞlog pðkÞ þ
j
X
k
X
pjðkÞlog pjðkÞ: ð4Þ
Thus, the computation of information transmitted, It, requires:
. what symbols were transmitted;
. what symbols were received; and
. the number of times each symbol received corresponded to each symbol
transmitted.
The latter values are the elements of the confusion matrix.
The confusion matrix in Shannon’s computation of information transmitted
Figure 3 shows the Shannon confusion matrix (after the descriptions in Shannon,
1974). The different columns of the confusion matrix represent the different kinds of
symbols sent (events) and the rows of the confusion matrix are labeled by each
possible symbol that can be received (outcomes). The matrix entries thus show how
many times one particular possible event occurred as one particular possible
outcome. When no errors occur, It ¼ IS, and the confusion matrix has nonzero
entries only on its diagonal; otherwise the transmission lacks fidelity (it has
“noisiness”).
Figure 3.
Claude Shannon’s
confusion matrix
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and pj (k) = Njk/Nj having received j, the probability that k had been transmitted
Source: After Shannon (1974)
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The use of Shannon information in sensory psychology
The conduct of the “category” or “absolute judgment” or “absolute identification”
experiment
Shannon’s Information Theory has been used to measure human performance in an
experiment that has taken on three interchangeable names over the years – “category
classification”, “absolute identification”, or “absolute judgment”. The latter expression is
the oldest and most popular. As noted earlier, Garner and Hake (1951) introduced
Shannon’s Information Theory to the analysis of the data. But the experimental method is
much older; it was already old when reviewed by Wever and Zener (1928). Absolute
judgment presents human subjects with sensory stimuli that are made to vary in one or
more physical attributes. Physical intensity is one example of a commonly used attribute,
corresponding, for example, to the sensation of loudness (for auditory stimuli) or of
brightness (for visual stimuli). When only intensity (for example) is varied, the other
physical attributes (e.g. frequency, for a tone, or hue, and for a color or a light) are held
constant as best as possible. The varied attribute has a continuum of values, called the
“event continuum”. The experimenter splits the event continuum into adjacent ranges,
the “stimulus categories”, with the restriction that each category cannot be smaller than
the empirical psychophysical just-noticeable-difference (jnd) in the stimulus attribute. For
tone intensity, for example, Garner (1953) used 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, or 20 categories. Categories are
named or numbered in rank order according to the magnitude of the varied attribute.
Thus, ten categories of tone intensity, say, would be labeled 1-10, or labeled as “very weak”
to “very strong” in ten steps. One experimental stimulus was chosen for presentation from
each category. As Garner and Hake (1951, p. 452) explained, “we are representing ranges
or classes of events with a single stimulus value [for each range]”.
A set of response categories are then chosen, which are adjacent ranges of the
stimulus attribute continuum, just like the stimulus categories. Each research
participant receives sessions of familiarization, in which the stimuli representing the
stimulus categories are assigned by the subject to the response categories. This is the act
of categorization. Its principle is that:
The range of stimuli may be placed along a dimension or continuum; furthermore, the
responses which O [the subject or “observer”] is to learn may be scaled and placed in a
consistent relationship or correlation with the stimulus continuum (Gibson, 1953, p. 408).
For initial familiarization and practice, the stimuli are presented first in (typically)
ascending order of the magnitude of the attribute that is varied, and then in random order
of that magnitude. When practice is over and the subsequent trials are to be counted, the
presentation order is always randomized. Garner and Hake (1951) did not prescribe that
the number of stimulus and response categories be equal; if they are unequal, however, the
stimuli must be forcibly parceled out amongst the response categories by the subject. Not
surprisingly, this mismatch affects It, the latter generally being largest with equal
numbers of stimulus and response categories (Eriksen and Hake, 1955a; Bevan and Avant,
1968; Kintz et al., 1969). Thus, equal numbers became the norm, so that the categorization
task became absolute identification, that is, correct naming of the presented stimuli.
The subject continues to practice identifying the stimuli until their performance
shows no obvious further improvement. Their performance is used to make a personal
equal-discriminability scale of the stimulus attribute (Garner, 1952). Stimuli that
are equidistant – those that are the easiest to tell apart, which should give the
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largest It – are then used. Subjects practice the absolute judgment task before each
day’s data recording. For judged attributes such as auditory tone frequency or intensity,
brightness of colors, and concentration of tastants or odorants, equal discriminability
meant equal spacing along logarithmic scales. In contrast, equal spacing on linear
scales was used for judgments of length or distance, and for judgments involving
muscular force (as, for example, for weights held in the hand).
Garner and Hake (1951): connecting information theory to perception
Garner and Hake (1951) computed It after the algebra of Shannon (1974; equations (2)-(4)
above). What differed was the confusion matrix; in the Garner-Hake confusion matrix,
rows represent response categories, and columns represent stimulus categories. Figure 4
shows the matrix. Each matrix entry represents the number of times the stimulus
representing a particular stimulus category was judged by the subject as being within a
particular response category. Or, in terms of absolute identification, each matrix entry is
the number of times that the stimulus of the respective column was named as the stimulus
of the respective row. It was computed from the matrix elements according to equation (4),
usually using base 2 for the logarithms, thus quantifying It in “binary units per stimulus”.
These units are usually abbreviated to “bits/stimulus”, and are the units used from here on.
An information transmitted of 1 bit/stimulus is equivalent to the perfect identification of
two stimuli, 2 bits/stimulus to perfect identification of four stimuli, and so on.
Garner and Hake (1951) justified their use of Shannon’s Information Theory through
the following model. Garner and Hake (1951, p. 446) declared that “The stimulus can be
Figure 4.
How Garner and Hake
(1951) use the Shannon
confusion matrix
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thought of as an event which occurs with a certain probability”. Whatever stimulus
attribute was manipulated in the absolute judgment experiment formed an “event
continuum” containing a potentially enormous number of events. When choosing stimuli
for presentation, “we are representing ranges or classes of events with a single stimulus
value” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 452). The experimental stimuli, to Garner and Hake,
were the elements of the Shannon communication system that transmit the event
(Figure 1). Thus, It computed from the absolute judgment experiment using the
Garner-Hake confusion matrix was “the amount of information about the event continuum
which a particular range of stimulus values [those used in the experiment] can transmit”
(Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 452), or “the amount of information which the stimuli transmit
to an O” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 459). Hartman summarized the Garner-Hake approach,
for his auditory stimuli: “We were to regard our [nine] tones as representing nine items of
knowledge about a particular continuum” (Hartman, 1954, p. 6). Figure 5 shows Garner
and Hake’s model of absolute judgment as information transmission.
Generally, in absolute judgment experiments, only one stimulus is presented at a
time (Wever and Zener, 1928). According to Garner and Hake, at the moment of its
presentation each stimulus becomes the Shannon transmitter. Garner and Hake did not
name the other elements of Shannon’s general communication system (Figure 1) – that
is, the source, the sent message, the channel, the received message, the receiver, and the
destination. It seems prudent to know their identities within the Garner-Hake
approach, but such must be inferred. The message would seem to be the succession
Figure 5.
The Garner and Hake
(1951) concept of
information transmission
in absolute judgment
experiments
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of stimuli given by the experimenter, thus (although the stimuli appear to be the
transmitters) the experimenter had to be the source. However, the experimenter also
recorded the subject’s responses, thus being the receiver of those responses, the
responses therefore being the received message. The experimenter also computed the
information transmitted, thus becoming the ultimate destination of the received
message. Altogether, there was just one role left for the human subject – that of
“channel”. It was left to Miller (1956a, p. 129) to state that role explicitly and to state its
use, as follows: “If a human operator is regarded as a communication channel with
stimuli for inputs and responses for outputs, it is possible to estimate maximum rates
of transmission through him”. That is, the psychologist’s confusion matrix yields
“the amount of information transmitted (by the human channel) from the set of stimuli
to the set of responses” (Landau et al., 1974, p. 239) or, in the words of Kintz et al. (1969,
p. 241), the “information transmitted through the subject”:
Some unsolved problems with the Garner and Hake approach
The average reader will by now have detected some inconsistencies in the Garner-Hake
approach. For example, stimuli were treated as “transmitters” but also as things
transmitted. Note well that Garner and Hake (1951) provided no mathematical or logic
proof that their interpretation of Shannon’s (1974) Information Theory actually
measured transmitted information in an absolute judgment experiment. And, no proofs
appeared later in the “citation classics” of Miller (1956b) and Attneave (1959).
Apparently, the Garner-Hake approach was taken on face value by those who used it.
The exception was Cronbach (1955), who made important technical criticisms that
were largely ignored at the time and that have been rarely mentioned since.
(Cronbach’s criticisms are not easily summarized in brief, and the reader is referred to
Cronbach (1955).)
Recall that the inputs and outputs of Shannon’s general communication system
(Figure 1) are, respectively, the “events” and the “outcomes”. Garner and Hake (1951)
computed the amount of information transmitted in perception by treating stimulus
categories as events, and response categories as outcomes. When the number of stimulus
categories equaled the number of response categories (i.e. the usual laboratory
procedure) the stimulus categories became both the events and the outcomes.
Each stimulus category, however, was represented empirically by a stimulus. Thus,
each entry in the Garner-Hake confusion matrix represents how often which stimulus
was identified as which by the experimental subject. That is, stimuli were the de facto
events and the subject’s identifications of them were the de facto outcomes. Those
outcomes were thus not events, being identifications of stimuli rather than the actual
physical stimuli, the Garner-Hake “events”. Compare and contrast this to Shannon’s
general communication system, within which each outcome is one of the events.
It can be shown that not only is the Garner-Hake approach not consistent with
Shannon’s ideas, it is not even consistent with its own. Garner and Hake (1951, p. 452)
admitted that “Which events (or how many) are represented by which particular
discrete stimulus is an arbitrary matter”, thus maintaining that stimuli represent
events. But they also stated that “The stimulus can be thought of as an event which
occurs with a certain probability” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 446), that is, the stimulus
is the event. All told, Garner and Hake described stimuli as transmitters, and as
representatives of events, and as actual events. Thus, they assigned any stimulus three
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different roles, roles that might seem mutually exclusive. Furthering the confusion,
Garner and Hake never actually defined “outcomes”.
Hopefully, it has become evident to the reader that there are serious problems with
the Garner and Hake view of information transmission. And there are more. Recall that
Garner and Hake treated the human experimental subject as the communication
channel of the absolute judgment experiment. However, Garner and Hake (1951, p. 459)
also declared that It represents “how accurately the O [observer] perceived which of
several alternative stimuli occurred on a particular presentation, or how much
information the O obtained about which stimulus occurred”. That is, the subjects
themselves obtain the information, by doing the experimenter’s job of computing the
information transmitted. That makes the subjects the receivers of the message, and
perhaps also the message’s destination, not just the channel.
In sum, Garner and Hake (1951) applied Shannon’s computations of information
transmitted to the psychologist’s absolute judgment experiment. Close inspection of
Garner and Hake (1951) reveals a variety of conflicting accounts of how the absolute
judgment experiment represents the object of Shannon’s algebra, that is, the transmission
of Shannon information within a Shannon general communication system.
The Garner-Hake computation of information transmitted appears to be inconsistent
with the Shannon computation of information transmitted. As such, what does the
Garner-Hake It represent?
The theoretical behavior of the human “channel capacity”
Answering the latter question requires a brief foray into the psychophysical
interpretation of the capacity of a communication system, as will be shown. Human
subjects, as channels, were not assumed to carry a limitless amount of information. In
that regard, Miller (1956b) explained something that Garner and Hake (1951) had
omitted from their discussion:
If the human observer is a reasonable kind of communication system, then when we increase
the amount of input information [i.e. stimulus information, IS] the transmitted information
will increase at first and will eventually level off at some asymptotic value. This asymptotic
value we take to be the channel capacity of the observer (Miller, 1956b, p. 82).
Empirically, when the categories are few and wide, each stimulus should be correctly
identified by the subject, such that It equals IS, the information available in the set of
stimuli used in the absolute judgment experiment (equation (2)). Now customarily,
absolute judgment experiments use a fixed overall stimulus range. Therefore,
increasing the number of categories employed decreases the width of each category.
This makes the subject sometimes assign stimuli to the wrong categories. It may still
increase, because the stimulus information IS has increased with the number of
categories; recall that when n stimuli are equiprobable (the usual experimental
situation) then IS ¼ log (n). As the stimulus range is partitioned into finer and finer
categories, however, It will hypothetically plateau, because the subject will prove
unable to obtain any more information during the absolute judgment task. Indeed, as
Miller (1956b, p. 86) noted:
On the basis of the present evidence it seems safe to say that we posses a finite and rather
small capacity for making such unidimensional judgments and that this capacity does not
vary a great deal from one simple sensory attribute to another.
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This capacity was dubbed “channel capacity”. It was especially promoted by Alluisi
(1957) and became widely accepted. Figure 6 shows channel capacity.
In the now-famous “The magical number seven, plus or minus two” (Miller, 1956b),
Miller declared the channel capacity to be “7^ 2” categories. Miller’s 7 ^ 2 categories
correspond to 2.81 bits/stimulus minus 0.49 bits/stimulus and plus 0.36 bits/stimulus.
MacRae (1970, p. 112) noted Miller’s (1956a, b) work, noting that “The quantitative
correspondence between quite different sensory modalities with this technique made it seem
likely that some fundamental aspect of performance was being measured”. Many further
attempts to measure channel capacity followed the publication of Miller’s paper.
The actual behavior of the human channel capacity
Information transmitted versus number of judged stimuli
Acceptance of a human channel capacity was broad, but early on, Cronbach (1955,
p. 15) sounded a subtle warning:
Pseudo-constancies can arise because of the way measuring procedures are devised, or from
balancing of opposing effects. In many studies where some degree of invariance is reported,
the experimental design has been insufficiently penetrating.
Miller (1956b) and especially Alluisi (1957) had proselytized the notion of an asymptote
in It, but actual data sometimes differed. For example, Pollack (1952) obtained Its for
pitch naming (frequency identification) of tones, using either of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 tones.
Pollack discovered that It was maximal for 7 tones. Pollack subsequently did a similar
experiment using either of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, or 14 tones, and found again that It peaked
at 7 tones, subsequently declined, and then climbed suddenly again for 14 tones.
Chapanis and Halsey (1956) found a peak and subsequent decline for color naming of
spots of light; It varied from 3.20 bits/stimulus for ten colors to 3.35 for 12 colors to 3.66
for 15 colors to 3.20 for 17 colors. Engen and Pfaffmann (1959) found that It for odor
intensity for either of 3, 5, 7, 10, or 13 concentrations of amyl acetate (banana odor)
peaked for seven concentrations and then fell slowly with increasing concentration.
Figure 6.
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Beebe-Center et al. (1955) found the same sort of rise and fall for the perceived intensity
of saltiness; they used either of 3, 5, 9, or 17 saline solutions. Figure 7 shows the
empirical rise and fall of It.
Despite evidence of an apparent maximum, the empirical behavior of It with
increase in the number of judged stimuli remained unclear. At times It seemed to
asymptote, at others to peak and then decline. Garner (1953) provided an inadvertent
clue to the mystery. In separate experiments, his subjects were required to identify
either of 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, or 20 tones of the same frequency but differing intensity,
according to their loudnesses. Where Garner differed from other investigators was in
how he processed the judgments. He used two methods. First, he pooled all of the
judgments over all of the participants, then computed It. Subsequently, he completely
re-computed an It for the subject group, by calculating It individually for each subject,
then averaging the Its across subjects to get a final, single It. For the pooled raw data
(i.e. first calculation method), It peaked for five stimuli (It ¼ 2.32 bits/stimulus), then
declined to 1.62 bits/stimulus for 20 stimuli. However, the across-subject-average It
(second calculation method) reached an asymptote, thus being higher for larger
numbers of stimuli than the It for pooled data. To summarize, the plot of It versus
number of stimuli differed by computational method. Now, most studies use the second
method, because it is easier when the experimenter uses different stimulus sets for each
subject, which is often done so that each subject has their own unique scale of
equidistant stimuli.
A statistical bias in the calculation of information transmitted
The second of Garner’s computations that give a subject group It, the popular one, in fact
contains a sampling bias. That bias causes It to be overestimated, and it increases as the
total number of stimulus presentations involved in computing It diminishes relative to
the number of stimulus categories (minus one, and assuming one stimulus per category),
Figure 7.
Stimulus information IS
for n equiprobable stimuli
(IS ¼ log2(n)), stimulus
equivocation ES
(equation (3)), and
information transmitted
It (equation (4))
as functions (in logarithms
to base 2) of the number of
stimuli presented in an
absolute judgment
experiment
It = IS-ES
Number of stimuli
Notes: The plot of It is styled after Beebe-Center et al. (1955),
Chapanis and Halsey (1956) and Engen and Pfaffmann (1959);
the plot of ES ( = IS – It) is inferred from the behaviors of IS and of It
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multiplied by the number of response categories (minus one). The source of the bias had
been recognized by theorists for some time, but it was MacRae (1970) who brought the
bias to general attention with a paper in Psychological Bulletin. There, MacRae detailed
the bias and its implications. Recall that the number of different stimuli used as “events”
typically equals the number of stimulus categories, which in turn usually equals the
number of response categories. Thus, from above, the overestimation of It increases with
the number n of different stimuli used, given a fixed total number of stimulus
presentations in the experiment trial. Now, IS depends only on n (equation (2)), not on the
number of stimulus presentations, and thus remains fixed and without bias. But as
equation (4) shows, It also involves the stimulus equivocation ES (equation (3)), which
involves the number of stimuli and the number of presentations (it depends upon the
entries in the confusion matrix, Figure 4), and is therefore biased. Knowing all this, the
excess in the value of It can be estimated under some reasonable statistical assumptions
(MacRae, 1970). It can be accordingly adjusted. MacRae (1970) did this for many sets
of published data, and finally concluded that channel capacity was an artefact.
The experiments had failed to involve a sufficient number of stimulus presentations, and
thus had been “insufficiently penetrating”, just as Cronbach (1955) had warned.
Avoiding such bias in the future requires pooling all data across all subjects into a single
confusion matrix, before computing It, i.e. the first method used by Garner (1953), and the
one less convenient for the experimentalist.
Despite MacRae’s conclusions, later papers still spoke of channel capacity (Russell,
1981; Fulgosi et al., 1987; Murphy et al., 2006), sometimes called “information
processing capacity” (Donkin et al., 2009). Indeed, as Murphy et al. (2010, p. 800)
declared, “It has long been known that unidimensional sensory channels are limited in
terms of the amount of information they can transmit (channel capacity; Miller, 1956a, b)”.
The reasons for the remarkable persistence of such beliefs were probably those of yore:
The view that transmission remains constant with increasing stimulus information survived in
spite of some contrary evidence because the usual effect of bias was to produce am-shaped curve
with sufficient irregularity for no trend to be compellingly evident. This allowed experimenters
and reviewers to plot a best-fitting horizontal line and identify it as the channel capacity [. . .]
When a choice of curves was available to represent an experimental design the most flat-topped
has usually been chosen [. . .] (MacRae, 1970, p. 119).
Remarkably, the findings of Garner (1953) and of MacRae (1970) were largely ignored;
experimenters continued to use large numbers of stimuli to probe imaginary channel
capacities. For example, Marteniuk (1971) employed 16 different stimuli, and so did
Russell and Marteniuk (1974; cited by Russell, 1981, and graphed therein). Ward (1991)
used 21, and Mori and Ward (1995) used 16, with the respective human subjects being
given no more than the usual familiarization training.
An explanation of the peak in the information transmitted
Empirically, subjects commit errors when they identify stimuli. The error rate can be
used to understand the peak in It with increase in number of stimuli that was actually
found by Beebe-Center et al. (1955), Chapanis and Halsey (1956) and Engen and
Pfaffmann (1959), and which, according to MacRae (1970), should be found in all
unbiased computations of It. To begin, note that for a constant rate of mistakes, It will
monotonically increase and eventually asymptote at what would appear to be a “channel
capacity”. But an asymptotic channel capacity is an artifact of biased computations
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(MacRae, 1970). Thus, the probability that a subject will misidentify a stimulus – let that
quantity be called the error rate – cannot be constant.
Why would a subject’s error rates differ? Quite possibly because absolute judgments
“are probably made by comparing the present stimulus with some average subjective
standard” (Garner and Hake, 1951, p. 446). That is, “absolute judgments” are not truly
absolute; most likely they involve comparisons. If so, we must then ask what “events”
are being compared to what “outcomes”. Sensations are evoked by stimuli whose
intensities exceed the absolute detection threshold. The sensations rise monotonically
with stimulus intensity. Therefore, stimulus and response categories, the columns and
rows, respectively, of the Garner-Hake confusion matrix (Figure 4), represent ranges of
sensations, as far as the human subject is concerned. An absolute judgment consists,
therefore, of identifying a sensation. That sensation may be compared to internal
standards, perhaps even without conscious awareness of the comparison process.
The internal standards must be the mental remnants of the sensations evoked by
previous stimuli, in particular, the exemplar stimuli that were given during the training
and practice phases of the experiment. The process of comparison is repeated over and
over to yield the entries of the confusion matrix. Comparison will become more
challenging with increasing number of stimuli to be identified. For example, for four
stimulus/response categories, categorization should be easy, although the subject will
occasionally misidentify a stimulus. But categorization becomes harder when the
number of categories increases to seven. Nonetheless, IS has risen as the number
of categories has risen, so that It for seven categories will exceed that for four.
For 12 categories, however, the memory traces of the exemplars are not as distinct as for
seven categories, so that the increase in IS caused by the greater number of stimuli is
offset by a greater error rate, hence an increase in ES, and consequently a decline in It. As
the number of different stimuli employed increases, then intuitively, the error rate must
also increase; the subject has too much to deal with attentionally, as will be explored
below. This notion is not well elaborated in the literature. Some critical number of stimuli
will be reached at which the increase in stimulus information is outstripped by the
increase in error rate. It will therefore rise, peak, and subsequently decline. IS and ES
tradeoff to produce the rise and fall of It that is seen for unbiased computations. Figure 7
shows that tradeoff.
The role of memory in absolute judgments
An interesting coincidence
Miller (1956b) briefly reviewed the contemporary memory literature and noted that we can
correctly remember 7 ; 2 items. Much evidence for that capacity had appeared over
1887-1925 (Guilford and Dallenbach, 1925) and appeared subsequent to Miller (1956b) over
1956-1973 (Broadbent, 1975). However, the literature since Broadbent, reviewed by Cowan
(2000), suggests a memory capacity of only 4; 1 items. That is, 7; 2 is really just the sum
of memory stores of 4; 1 and 3; 1. In that case, memory capacity correlates to It: typically,
It ¼ 2 bits/stimulus, representing correct identification of four stimuli, for minimally
trained subjects (Eriksen and Hake, 1955a; Hawkes and Warm, 1960; Tulving and
Lindsay, 1967; Vianello and Evans, 1968; Bechinger et al., 1969; Landau et al., 1974; Locke,
1974, 1975; Fulgosi et al., 1987; Mori and Ward, 1992, 1995; Hettinger et al., 1999). It can
exceed 2 bits/stimulus when subjects receive more practice, i.e. when they are allowed
further learning, improving their memory of the stimuli (Pollack, 1953; Ward, 1953;
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Hanes and Rhoades, 1959; Pylyshyn and Agnew, 1962; Terman, 1965; Feallock et al., 1966;
Friedman, 1967; Steedman, 1967; Cuddy, 1968; Egeth and Pachella, 1969; Fulgosi
and Bartolovic, 1971; Heller and Auerbach, 1972; Fulgosi and Zaja, 1975; Fulgosi et al.,
1984, 1986).
What relation of memory capacity to information content?
The apparent equality of memory capacity and maximum It for lightly trained subjects
can be interpreted in two ways: either information capacity represents a constant
amount of memory, or memory capacity represents a constant amount of information.
If the latter, then the memory span should change, being small when individual items in
memory contain much information, and vice versa. Empirically, such is not the case for
memory of strings of unrelated words or digits, as reviewed by Miller (1956a), a
conclusion thoroughly confirmed (Slak, 1974). We must therefore now examine the
converse, that is, whether maximum It for lightly trained subjects is independent of
memory capacity. For this, there are no authoritative sources in the literature.
The present author therefore reviewed roughly 60 empirical papers on It.
Absolute judgments appear to be sensitive to residual memories of previous stimuli
(Wever and Zener, 1928; Campbell et al., 1958; Miller and Engen, 1960; Di Lollo, 1964).
The absolute judgment task can be altered to patently reduce or remove the memory
load, and in such cases information transmission rises remarkably (Klemmer and Frick,
1953, replicated by Petiot and Parrot, 1980; Chapanis and Overbey, 1971). Tulving and
Lindsay (1967) took a different tack; they found that when subjects were presented with
two difference kinds of stimuli simultaneously (e.g. lights and tones), judging one right
after the other reduced the respective Its relative to those found when judging just one
kind of stimulus. Tulving and Lindsay concluded that distraction (a central neurological
effect) was to blame for the decrease, rather than information capacity, the latter
presumably being determined at the sensory receptor. Egeth and Pachella (1969)
reported similar findings for sugar/salt solutions judged on both saltiness and
sweetness.
Absolute judgments involve idiosyncracies that might not be anticipated when
viewing the human being as a Shannon communication system. One such idiosyncracy
is that It improves when the subject is continuously informed of the correctness of their
judgments, called “feedback” (Hartman, 1954; Engen and Pfaffmann, 1959; Agnew et al.,
1966; Friedman, 1967; Steedman, 1967; Ward and Lockhead, 1970; Siegel, 1972; McNicol,
1975; Mori and Ward, 1995). The Shannon general communication system has no such
active process (although Shannon did eventually illustrate and discuss such a process
(Shannon, 1974, Figure 8). Thus, feedback in absolute judgments violates the model
system that underlies Shannon’s algebra. Another idiosyncracy of absolute judgments
is that repeating them, with the subject given appropriate breaks, always improves It
(Pollack, 1953; Ward, 1953; Eriksen and Hake, 1955a; Hanes and Rhoades, 1959; Hawkes,
1961; Pylyshyn and Agnew, 1962; Terman, 1965; Feallock et al., 1966; Friedman, 1967;
Steedman, 1967; Cuddy, 1968; Vianello and Evans, 1968; Egeth and Pachella, 1969;
Fulgosi and Bartolovic, 1971; Fullard et al., 1972; Heller and Auerbach, 1972; Fulgosi and
Zaja, 1975; Costall et al., 1981; Fulgosi et al., 1984, 1986; Hettinger et al., 1999; Petrov and
Anderson, 2005). In terms of Figure 7, this practice effect makes the peak in It move to the
right. Terminating practice allows forgetting, and judgment scores then typically
decline, as reviewed by Gibson (1953). Practice consolidates a task in memory;
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in contrast, Shannon’s general communication system has no accommodation for either
learning or forgetting.
There is yet another interesting idiosyncracy of absolute judgments: that It increases
when subjects are better motivated (Rouder et al., 2004). This factor is not
accommodated by the Shannon general communication system. Still another factor
not accommodated by Shannon is that It improves with increase in the physical range
covered by a given number of different test stimuli (Eriksen and Hake, 1955a; Pollack,
1956; Engen and Pfaffmann, 1959; Hawkes, 1961; Garner et al., 1966; Mori and Ward,
1992; Brown et al., 2005). However, as stimuli get farther apart physically, they become
more distinct, hence easier to remember. As such, up to some point It should remain
constant as the number of stimuli decreases but their physical separation increases,
a notion confirmed by Alluisi (1957).
It decreases under “contrast”, in which each stimulus to be judged is preceded by a
fixed stimulus that is physically outside the range of the judged stimuli (Heintz, 1950,
replicated by Salzinger, 1957). Compare this to the Shannon general communication
Figure 8.
A new, memory-centered
model of absolute
judgments
Reinforcement
from feedback
Training phase
Testing phase
Category
Category
Category
Category
Notes: See text; the response distributions are assumed, for simplicity’s sake, to be symmetric;
in fact, however, they will become increasingly skewed towards the nearest end of the stimulus
range as the respective stimulus gets closer to that end; this happens because the subject can make
mistakes towards lower or higher stimuli when the stimulus is in the middle, but as the stimulus nears
the ends, subjects will increasingly make mistakes in one direction, i.e. towards the center, because
that direction offers the greater number of different erroneous choices; skewness is greatest at the
very ends of the stimulus scale, because there the subject can only err towards the middle
(see succeeding figures)
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system, in which inserting a fixed symbol between each message symbol sent,
and then assembling the message only from the message symbols, should not affect
the information transmitted. However, “contrast” can be explained if the fixed stimulus
is used as an unhelpful reference standard in memory for identifying the stimuli.
Consider now absolute judgments without a fixed contrast stimulus. There is
nonetheless a tendency:
[. . .] for a response to a given stimulus category to be higher when the preceding stimulus is
higher than the one being judged, and lower when the preceding stimulus is lower (Garner,
1953, p. 377; see Tresselt’s review, 1947).
This type of sequential dependence is called “assimilation”. Assimilation is robust,
because it happens even under feedback (Holland and Lockhead, 1968), which should
have counteracted any judgment bias. Some experiments have found both assimilation
and contrast (Sherif et al., 1958, replicated by Parducci and Marshall, 1962; McKenna,
1984), and assimilation is found even when contrast is not used (Rouder et al., 2004;
Brown et al., 2005; Petrov and Anderson, 2005). Note that information transmission in
the Shannon general communication system has no equivalent to assimilation. However,
Luce et al. (1982) performed elaborate experiments which suggested that a stimulus is a
memory aid for the next stimulus when the two are similar and is a distractor when the
two differ. A supporting limiting case is that when the two stimuli are the same, the later
of the pair is more likely to be correctly identified than otherwise (Costall et al., 1981).
Absolute judgments are also subject to a phenomenon called “masking”, that is
known outside of the literature on absolute judgments. In masking, one stimulus
interferes with a psychological aspect of another. The masker stimulus and the masked
stimulus need not coincide (“simultaneous” masking); the masker may precede
(“forward masking”) or even follow (“backward masking”) the masked stimulus.
In absolute judgments, masking empirically causes It to fall; backward masking
(Ward, 1991) and simultaneous, forward, and backward masking (Mori and Ward, 1992)
have been found. Current wisdom is that backward masking occurs physiologically
centrally and involves memory (see the comments in Nizami et al. (2002)). We may
consider forward or backward masking in absolute judgments to be a form of “contrast”,
for which the It from the Shannon general communication system should not have
changed, but did, perhaps because the sensation evoked by the masker was stored in
memory and used as a reference for the stimulus identification.
Another unique aspect of absolute judgments is “end-anchoring”. There, the greatest
and least stimuli of the stimulus set are identified with greater accuracy than the stimuli
in-between (Pollack, 1952, 1953; Garner, 1953; Eriksen and Hake, 1955a; Engen and
Pfaffmann, 1959; Pylyshyn and Agnew, 1962; Terman, 1965; Spitz, 1967; Steedman,
1967; Cuddy, 1968; Holland and Lockhead, 1968; Snelbecker and Fullard, 1972;
Lacouture, 1997; Lacouture and Lacerte, 1997; Elvevag et al., 2004; Rouder et al., 2004;
Brown et al., 2005; Petrov and Anderson, 2005; McCormack et al., 2002; Murphy et al.,
2010). Eriksen and Hake (1955a) confirmed, through several elaborate experiments, that
the greatest and least stimuli are used as judgment standards. Indeed, end-anchoring
decreases when the use of end stimuli as standards is prevented or obstructed (Pollack,
1953; Cuddy, 1968; Heller and Auerbach, 1972; Locke, 1975) and disappears altogether
when a stimulus set (such as a “color wheel”) has no apparent ends (Volkmann and
Engen, 1961; Costall et al., 1981). Also, when the middle stimulus of an odd-numbered
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stimulus set is made distinct from its neighbors by greater spacing, it can be named
correctly with the same frequency as for the end stimuli (Neath et al., 2006; see also
Lacouture, 1997). Presumably, greater perceptual distinctness aided remembrance and
hence identification (Neath et al., 2006).
Siegel (1972) performed what was arguably the single most important experiment
on absolute judgments. Siegel hypothesized that when subjects are given feedback
stimulus-by-stimulus, the correct answer is remembered, rendering the stimulus easier
to identify on its subsequent presentation, the effect presumably declining with
increase in the number of stimuli intervening between any two identical stimuli. Siegel
confirmed his hypothesis, concluding that “If there is a channel capacity for absolute
judgments of unidimensional stimuli, it is an asymptote on forgetting” (Siegel, 1972,
p. 125). Aiken et al. (1973) confirmed Siegel’s results.
And there is more. In principle, stimuli can physically change in more than one
dimension, in which case the subject can be asked to separately categorize each
dimension. For example, a tone’s intensity and its frequency can both be varied, and the
subject asked to identify the intensity and then the frequency (or vice versa). It for overall
identification by intensity and frequency is then computed using special multidimension
versions of equation (2)-(4) (Attneave, 1959), although It can still be computed separately
for each physical dimension. The single-dimension Its thus computed are:
. smaller than are found when only one dimension is varied; and
. sum to less than the overall multidimension It (Pollack, 1953; Pollack and Ficks,
1954; Beebe-Center et al., 1955; Eriksen and Hake, 1955b; Garner and Creelman,
1964; Lockhead, 1966; Egeth and Pachella, 1969; Fulgosi et al., 1975).
There is no explanation for these observations within the Shannon general
communication system. There is, however, a memory explanation: a stimulus
possessing multiple unique features is more likely to be correctly identified because,
like a human face, it is unique.
On a final note, memory strength seems to be generally independent of stimulus
duration, so that if It is memory dependent, then it too should be duration independent.
That characteristic has been confirmed (Garner and Creelman, 1964; Garner et al., 1966;
Egeth and Pachella, 1969; Ward, 1991).
Altogether, a review of a great deal of literature suggests that the absolute judgment
task shows behaviors not attributable to a Shannon general communication system.
The review also suggests that the maximum It found for lightly trained subjects is not
independent of memory capacity. In total, then, absolute judgments represent not
information transmission, but a test of memory, such that channel capacity is actually
memory capacity. The Shannon general communication system is now clearly an
incorrect model of the absolute judgment task. A new model in terms of memory will
be offered, as follows.
A memory model of absolute judgments
Variability in comparisons
It is well established that as a given stimulus is repeated, a distribution of spike counts
results (for hearing, see for example, Nizami and Schneider, 1997; Nizami, 2005). Here,
for simplicity, that distribution is assumed to be Gaussian and of equal variance for all
stimuli. (The sensory literature generally supports such an assumption, although the
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appropriate stimulus-intensity scale may be logarithmic rather than linear in intensity,
just like the scales used in absolute judgments.) As far as spike counts become
sensations, the multiple presentations of any given stimulus, the exemplar for its
stimulus category, will thus result in a distribution of sensations. Each sensation
presumably becomes a memory trace; thus the traces are distributed. Each memory
trace can presumably be accessed when needed, with an efficacy that is assumed to not
change over time. What does presumably change over time is the variance of the
memory trace, which broadens (memory “decay”). Now, when the subject makes an
absolute judgment, the test stimulus evokes a sensation, which instantly becomes a
memory that is presumably compared to the memory traces of the sensations evoked
by the exemplars. In the experiment, the comparison process for each stimulus covers,
on average, the same range of decay of the traces of the exemplars. This is because
experimentally, both in the training sessions and in the testing sessions:
. the presentation of the stimuli is randomized in order of the varied physical
characteristic(s); and
. the different stimuli are each presented the same number of times.
Because the things to be compared are presumably distributed as Gaussians, the
subjects’ stimulus categorizations/identifications are also presumably distributed as
Gaussians. The response distributions are assumed to be equal in variance. However,
at the ends of the stimulus range, subjects can err only towards the center of the range.
Thus, it is assumed that when stimuli are near the ends of the stimulus range,
the resulting response distributions will become asymmetric, their peaks rising and
shifting towards those ends (skewness). The closer the stimulus to the end, then the
greater the skewness of the distribution. For all stimuli, the most likely response,
represented by the peak of the response distribution, will presumably fall within
the correct stimulus category/identity.
Figure 8 shows the memory model of the categorization/identification process in
absolute judgments. In this and subsequent figures, the open dots represent the
exemplars, taken from the perceptual center of each category. The upper left quadrant of
the illustration, behind the hashed line, shows the training phase. There, the subject is
exposed to the exemplars. Here, for the sake of convenience, just three categories are
shown. The response categories, to which the stimuli are assigned by the subject, have
been omitted from the “training phase” picture for the sake of clarity. In the testing phase
(the rest of the picture), a given test stimulus (one of the exemplars) is encoded as it was in
the training phase. The resulting sensation evokes a memory trace that is distributed,
although not as widely as for the original exemplars because the trace is fresher.
The trace is then compared to the traces of some or all of the original exemplars in a
categorization decision. Because the traces of the original exemplars are distributed, so
are the subject’s categorization responses. Note well that Garner and Hake (1951) and
their adherents ignored these issues, thus implying that the subjects have perfect
memory. The probability that the subject names a particular stimulus as being in a given
category is equal to the area, lying between the category’s boundaries, under the
stimulus’ evoked response distribution. Also, recall from above that when correctness
feedback is given, categorization/identification gets better, and the relevant memory
traces momentarily decrease in variance; hence the path labeled “Reinforcement from
feedback”.
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Anticipated behavior of information transmitted with narrowing of categories
The usual experimental condition for absolute judgments is to keep the overall
stimulus range fixed, so that increasing the number of categories, when desired, is done
by equally narrowing each category. As categories thus narrow, the number of
different stimuli (at one per category) increases. So, too, does the number of memory
traces to which the memory of the test stimulus’ sensation is compared during the
absolute judgment. With stimuli fitted into a fixed physical range, memory traces are
crammed into a fixed mental range. Thus, as the number of stimuli increases,
the memory of each becomes less distinct; this manifests in the model as an increase
of the variance of the distribution of each memory trace. Figures 9-11, respectively,
show this behavior as the number of categories increases from four to seven to 12 and
the mental impressions of the category boundaries become correspondingly less
distinct. The concepts of training, and the conversion of neuronal responses into
memory traces, are omitted from the illustration, for the sake of clarity.
Actual distributions of absolute judgments
Surprisingly, little published data could be found on the distribution of subject’s
absolute judgments, but what exists does support the model. van Krevelen (1951)
found symmetrical, single-peaked response distributions of roughly equal variance for
tones of 415.30 Hz (in music, G sharp), 440 Hz (A), and 466.16 Hz (A sharp). Those tones
were not near the ends of van Krevelen’s employed stimulus range (hence their lack of
skewness). The judgments were done by persons having an exceptional ability to name
tones, called “perfect pitch” (for an explanation and review, see Takeuchi and Hulse,
1993). However, subjects not having perfect pitch (Terman, 1965) produced similar
response distributions, for tones of 155.6, 261.6, and 440.0 Hz which (again) were not
near the end of the stimulus range. However, the distributions were noticeably wider at
440 Hz than van Krevelen’s (1951), and generally widened with increase in frequency.
Figure 9.
The distributions of the
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(In the present model, perfect pitch is an improved memory for tone identity,
manifested as the narrowing of distributions of the memory traces of the exemplars,
and hence of the distributions of the absolute judgments.) In a different approach,
Miyazaki (1988) had subjects differentiate either 180 sawtooth waves representing
notes, or 180 synthesized piano notes. Miyazaki found the same distribution
Figure 10.
Similar to Figure 9, but for
seven categories rather
than four
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Figure 11.
Similar to Figures 9 and
10, but for 12 categories
rather than four or seven
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phenomena as discovered by van Krevelen (1951) and by Terman (1965), except that
distribution variances hardly changed according to stimulus, although distributions
did become increasingly skewed as the stimuli neared the ends of the stimulus range.
Note that the distributions of the responses can be assembled from the entries in the
confusion matrix itself; unfortunately, few papers displayed empirical confusion
matrices.
After the first draft of the present manuscript was written (in 2008), the author became
aware of some crucial empirical data, as follows. Skewness of response distributions
shows clearly for absolute judgments of the duration (McCormack et al., 2002; Murphy
et al., 2010) and of the pitch (McCormack et al., 2002) of pure (i.e. single frequency) tones.
For 500-Hz tones of various durations, McCormack et al. (2002) plotted the proportion of
subjects’ responses as a function of those responses (e.g. “Tone duration was category 3”,
etc.), plots that they called “response gradients”. These plots, one for each stimulus
category k, consist of discrete data points, each representing pk (j) ¼ Njk/N.k – the
probability that the stimulus was placed in category j when in fact it was from category k
(for explanation, see Figure 4). The plots of actual pk (j) are the discrete real-world versions
of the theoretical continuous distributions shown in Figures 9-11. That is, the theoretical
distributions for seven categories, seen in Figure 10, have their real-world counterpart in
the plots of actual pk (j) for six categories and for nine categories shown by McCormack
et al. (2002). McCormack et al. found similar behavior for what they called the “distribution
gradients”, the separate plots, for each response category j, of pj (k) ¼ Njk/Nj. ( ¼ the
probability that the stimulus was from category k when in fact it was placed into
category j; see Figure 4). McCormack et al. also plotted response gradients of pk (j) for
absolute judgments of pitch (nine different auditory frequencies) and found the same
pattern as for tone duration. Later, Murphy et al. (2010) confirmed, for durations of 6 tones
of 2 kHz, the shapes of the response gradients for duration judgments of 6 tones of 500 Hz
found by McCormack et al. (2002). Figure 12 shows response gradients of the kind found
by McCormack et al. (2002) and by Murphy et al. (2010).
Overall, then, the predicted response distributions of Figures 9-11 are confirmed for
tone duration and pitch. Similar patterns of response gradients were found for rod
length (Neath et al., 2006) and for tone duration and for line length (Elvevag et al., 2004).
All of these patterns emerge for stimuli that are equally spaced on whatever scale
(linear or logarithmic) allows equal discriminability between neighboring stimuli.
However, absolute judgments have also been done in which one or more stimuli in the
middle of the stimulus set have been separated from the others. In such cases, those
“isolated” stimuli should stand out in memory, perhaps to the point that they can be
used as anchors for the absolute judgments. In such cases, we would expect fewer
identification errors for the isolated stimuli, and in fact that is what occurs (Lacouture,
1997, for lengths of lines; Neath et al., 2006, for tone durations, rod lengths, heaviness of
weights, and numerosity of squares). We would expect pk ( j) to correspondingly
increase for the isolated stimuli, and Neath et al. (2006) illustrate this, at least, for rod
lengths (graphs were not provided for the other types of stimuli used). There is yet
another effect that is not covered in the simplified model underlying Figures 9-11,
namely, that the plot of the empirical response gradients can show greater skewness of
pk ( j) for the lowest-magnitude stimulus among the stimuli presented than for the
highest-magnitude stimulus. This effect is clearly evident for judgments of tone
durations and of line lengths in Elvevag et al. (2004). Its origin is still debated.
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What is the true limit of “information transmitted”?
Empirical Its are always less than their possible maxima, the stimulus information IS.
Explanations were offered in the literature, explanations typified by that of Fulgosi et al.
(1986, p. 380): “In the process of transforming physical energy into physiological energy
and judgments, a significant amount of information is lost”. That is, information
transmission is noisy. Notwithstanding this engineering “lossy channel” interpretation,
we have seen that there is a credible second explanation: that is, that the empirical It
represents the limits of memory, not those of a noisy transmission channel. As noted
above, It typically equals or exceeds 2 bits/stimulus, the latter representing four
perfectly identifiable categories. But the number four also characterizes modern
estimates of memory capacity (Cowan, 2000, 2010), and channel capacity does indeed
appear to be memory capacity. Such a result is too neat, of course; as noted above,
subjects given extensive practice can produce Its that are much bigger than 2
bits/stimulus. Suddenly, memory capacity no longer equals channel capacity. But
consider what is achieved during practice: practice consolidates a task in memory.
Logically, higher Its actually reflect improved memory. This begs the question of how
memory capacity can remain constant but memory itself can improve. The answer was
found by Ericsson et al. (1980) in an unusually painstaking experiment. There, a single
experimental subject (Faloon) increased his memory for random digits from seven to 80
digits over 20 months of training. The subject’s enhanced ability evidently derived from
dividing the presented digits into seven supergroups, each consisting of three groups of
three or four digits per group, plus a final group of five digits. Nonetheless, his immediate
memory capacity was not believed to have ever been greater than 4 ^ 1 digits.
The grouping of digits was attributed to “long-term” memory. We may hence postulate
Figure 12.
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Notes: Tones 1-8 had respective durations of 220, 300, 410, 560, 750, 1,000, 1,310, and 1,700 ms; data
points are arithmetic averages of the two sets of data points shown in the upper panels of Figure 5 of
Murphy et al. (2010), which in turn represented arithmetic averages of scores, respectively, obtained
from two groups of experimental subjects (original data kindly supplied by Prof. Dana Murphy); note the
wave-like appearance of the plots, imitating the theoretical distributions of Figures 9-11 but suggesting that
those distributions should perhaps be more sharply peaked
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that whenever It exceeds 2 bits/stimulus, there has been an improvement in the memory
used for the task despite a fixed memory capacity. Improvement in empirical It with
practice is represented by a rightward shift in the peak of the curve for It in Figure 7.
Summary
In 1948, Claude Shannon produced his now-famous model of the general communication
system (reprinted in Shannon, 1974), and his accompanying equations for computing the
amount of information transmitted within that system. Barely three years later,
Shannon’s work was re-interpreted by the Harvard psychologists Garner and Hake
(1951) to suit absolute judgments done in the psychology laboratory. The Garner-Hake
reformulation of information transmitted was part of a trend whose impact was
profound:
Born of papers by Claude Shannon and the book, Cybernetics, by Norbert Wiener, information
theory looked then like the young man in a very great hurry who jumped on his horse and
rode off in all directions. Standard-bearers of information theory were plunging into genetics,
neurophysiology, sociology, experimental psychology, linguistics, and philosophy with great
enthusiasm and greater hopes. Many problems that had long resisted even adequate
formulation seemed about to succumb to information theory (Cohen, 1966, p. 1).
The Garner-Hake approach remains in use. It works as follows. A stimulus (visual,
auditory, gustatory, olfactory, or somesthetic) is varied in one or more characteristics
by the experimenter, and the resulting set of stimuli are assigned to categories
according to the varied characteristic(s), again by the experimenter. The experimental
subject then learns to identify the stimuli by their categories. Once learned, all of the
stimuli are presented again to the subject, singly and randomized by the varied
characteristic, and the subject must identify each stimulus by its category. Each
stimulus category becomes the column of a Shannon confusion matrix, and each
response category becomes a row. Each entry in the matrix thus represents the
proportion of times that a stimulus from one particular category is assigned to another
particular category. Those proportions lead through Shannon’s equations to the
information transmitted, It. It allegedly empirically asymptotes at a limit called the
“channel capacity” as the stimulus set gets larger. That is, the psychology literature
states that there is a limit to the number of different stimuli that a human being can
consistently identify correctly.
The present author examined the behavior of It by critically reviewing decades of
absolute judgment literature. The alleged asymptote in It proves to be an artifact.
Further, the Garner-Hake use of information theory has been inconsistent. Also, absolute
judgments are characterized by idiosyncracies such as effects of feedback, practice,
motivation, stimulus range, contrast, assimilation, masking, end-anchoring, and so on
and so forth. Those idiosyncracies cannot be explained in terms of a Shannon general
communication system. Indeed, It cannot be said to have a known upper limit. It can be
improved by intensive training, such that the number of consistently correctly identified
stimuli can greatly exceed the apparent limit of four, or at best seven, that was posited in
the Garner-Hake literature. Such an improvement can be understood if absolute
judgment is regarded as a test of memory. In memory experiments, it has been well
established that only four to seven stimuli can be consistently correctly identified
without special training. But these are the same numbers that arise from absolute
judgments (again, without special training). Because of these concerns, the present paper
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offers a novel model of absolute judgment. In that model, training using stimulus
exemplars establishes memory traces of the sensations evoked by the stimuli. Stimuli
subsequently presented for judgment create traces that are compared to the memories of
the exemplars. Over many such comparisons, a distribution of absolute judgments
results, which widens with increase in the number of different stimuli judged. The model
mandates that judgment distributions for the stimuli at the extremes of the employed
stimulus range are skewed and that the skewness increases with increase in the number
of different stimuli judged. The latter are found in the literature.
Conclusions
Shannon’s (1948; reprinted in 1974) Information Theory has been employed since 1951 to
quantify the human ability to make absolute judgments (Garner and Hake, 1951).
That analysis treated humans as “communication channels” of limited capacity.
However, the literature contains substantial evidence that the alleged “channel capacity”
is in fact a memory capacity, a capacity whose value is well established from memory
experiments. Thus, absolute judgment experiments can be envisioned as tests of
memory, and a model for such has been presented here. In retrospect, further use of
absolute judgments to assess “channel capacity” are redundant, and even retrogressive
because of their diversion of time and effort away from better interpretations of human
capability.
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